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1. INTRODUCTION
Temporal logic is a language for expressing relationships between the order of
events occurring over time. A salient feature of the logic is the ability to build
nested expressions using ‘‘Until.’’ We establish a strict hierarchy of expressive power
for temporal formulas based on Until nesting depth. To do this, we design a new
EhrenfeuchtFra@ sse (EF) game to specifically capture the power of linear temporal
logic, LTL. (See Ehrenfeucht (1961) and Fra@ sse (1954) for origins, and, e. g.,
Immerman and Kozen (1989) and Thomas (1993) for more recent use of EF
games.) We use our game to show that, for each k1, there is a property FAIRk+1
that cannot be expressed with k&1 nestings of Until operators, regardless of the
number of applications of other operators. However, FAIRk+1 can be expressed
with a formula that has Until depth k. FAIRk is a simple and natural counting
property which amounts to precisely a quantitative version of the notion of strong
fairness, also known as ‘‘compassion’’ (Manna and Pnueli 1992). In words, FAIRk
says: ‘‘there is no interval of time in which event a (e.g., a request by a process)
occurs k times but event b (a response) does not occur.’’ We observe that our Until
hierarchy proof for LTL carries over easily to the branching time logics CTL and
CTL*.
Kamp (1968) proved a long time ago that linear temporal logic is equivalent in
expressive power to first-order logic on structures with unary predicates and a
(Dedekind-complete) total ordering (see also Gabbay et al. (1980, 1994)). We use
the properties FAIRk to draw some consequences about the relationship between
the Until depth required to express a property in temporal logic and the first-order
quantifier depth required to express the same property. FAIRk is expressible via a
first-order formula of quantifier depth O(log k) using only three variables, as well
as a formula of quantifier depth and size O(log k) using five variables. Moreover, for
all k, STAIRk is expressible with a formula of alternation depth 2. Thus, there are
properties whose expression requires exponentially more Until depth than first-
order quantifier depth. These results complement some strong succinctness results
that can be derived from a proof of Stockmeyer’s (1974) combined with other
considerations, as will be discussed in Section 5.
Since LTL formulas define regular sets, a natural question that has been asked
is whether a given regular set is expressible within LTL or within one of its
fragments. The work of Schu tzenberger (1965), Kamp (1968), McNaughton and
Papert (1971), and Gabbay et al. (1980) yields an effective characterization of the
finite automata recognizing LTL definable sets, while Cohen et al. (1993) provides
an effective characterization for the LTL formulas that do not use the Until
operator. Both those characterizations make heavy use of semigroup-theoretic
techniques. We use the EF game in a novel way by ‘‘playing on finite automata’’ to
simplify the proof of the second result and provide an effective characterization for
LTL formulas that use Eventually as the only temporal operator. This answers a
question raised by Cohen et al. and extends Sistla and Zuck (1993).
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review some basic notions;
in Section 3 we introduce the EF game for LTL; in Section 4 we prove the Until
hierarchy theorem and its extensions; in Section 5 we draw some consequences from
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the proof of the hierarchy theorem regarding the relationship between LTL and
first-order logic; in Section 6 we use the game in a new way to provide automata-
theoretic characterizations for fragments of LTL; and in Section 7 we make
concluding remarks.
2. TERMINOLOGY AND NOTATION
For thorough coverage of definitions and background related to temporal logic
please see the survey Emerson (1990) or the book Gabbay et al. (1994). We view
linear temporal logic as expressing properties of words. As usual, we start indexing
the positions of a word w at 0, and |w| stands for the length of the word, with
|w|= for |-words. Given an alphabet 7=[a1 , ..., an], LTL formulas are com-
posed of atomic propositions pa1 , ..., pan , the Boolean connectives c, 7 , 6 , and
the temporal operators Next (m), Eventually (h), and Until (U). We refer to the
fragments of LTL without U, and without U and m, by LTL(m, h) and LTL(h),
respectively.
Given a word w=w0w1 w2 ..., and given a position i<|w| in w, we let (w, i)<.
denote the fact that . is true on w at position i, and we define this inductively in
the usual way, adopting the following standard conventions for the semantics of
atomic formulas and temporal operators:
v (w, i)<par if wi=ar ,
v (w, i)<m . if i+1<|w| and (w, i+1)<.,
v (w, i)<h . if there exists j with i j<|w| such that (w, j)<.,
v (w, i)<. U  if there exists j with i j<|w| such that (w, j)< and
(w, i $)<. for all i $ with ii $< j.
We will be interested in the depth of a formula with respect to various operators.
This is defined inductively in the natural way. We first give a general definition. Let
2=[%1 , %2 , ..., %k] be a set of temporal operators, where % i (.1 , ..., .ri) denotes the
arity ri operator %i applied to the given sequence of formulas. (In this notation .U
is written U(., ).) We define 2-depth, inductively:
2-dp( paj)=0 ,
2-dp(c.)=2-dp(.) ,
2-dp(. 6 )=max(2-dp(.), 2-dp()) ,
2-dp(%$(.1 , ..., .r$))=max(2-dp(.1), ..., 2-dp(.r$)) if %$  2 ,
2-dp(%i (.1 ,...,.ri))=max(2-dp(.1),..., 2-dp(.ri))+1 if %i # 2 .
We will use operator depth to refer to [m, h, U]-depth, U-depth to refer to
[U]-depth, and residual depth to refer to [m, h]-depth. It is worth mentioning
here that the notion of U-depth is rather robust and is unaffected by the usual
minor variations in the definition of temporal operators.
We say that (v, i) and (w, j) are k-equivalent iff they agree on all formulas of
operator depth k or less. We denote this by (v, i)#k (w, j). Note that (v, i)#0 (w, j)
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if and only if the two words have the same character at positions i and j, respec-
tively. Let (v, i)#k, r (w, j) denote the fact that (v, i) and (w, j) agree on all formulas
. with U-depth k and residual depth r.
A property is just a set of strings or a set of |-words, and we say a LTL formula
. defines or expresses a property K iff K=[w | (w, 0)<.].
When using first-order logic to express properties of words, we view a word as
a first-order structure (U, <, Pa1 , ..., Pan), where Pa1 , ..., Pan are unary predicates
and U is an initial segment of the natural numbers which is well ordered by the
built-in relation <.
3. AN EF GAME FOR TEMPORAL LOGIC
We now define the EF game for temporal logic. The k-round LTL EF game is
played on a pair of words (w0 , w1) and starts from a prespecified initial configura-
tion (i0 , i1), where a configuration is a pair of positions in w0 and w1 , respectively.
The game is defined inductively as follows. In the 0-round game, there are no
rounds to be played, and if (w0 , i0)0 (w1 , i1) Player I wins; otherwise Player II
wins. In the (k+1)-round game, Player I wins if (w0 , i0) 0 (w1 , i1). Otherwise, if
(w0 , i0)#0 (w1 , i1), one round is played, which either results in a win for Player I
or a new configuration (i$0 , i$1). In the second case, they then play a k-round game
on (w0 , w1) with initial configuration (i$0 , i$1).
A round of the game proceeds as follows. At the beginning of a round, with the
game in some configuration (i0 , i1), Player I chooses one of three types of moves
and they play according to this choice as follows.
[m-Move]
Player I may only choose this move if i0+1<|w0 | or i1+1<|w1 | (i. e., if we
have not reached the end in one of the words). Player I then wins if i0+1=|w0 |
or i1+1=|w1 | (i. e., if we are at the end of one word but not the other). Otherwise,
the new configuration is (i0+1, i1+1).
[h-Move]
1. Player I chooses w$ , $ # [0, 1], and a position i $$ in w$ with i$i $$<|w$ |.
2. Player II responds by choosing a position i $1&$ in w1&$ with
i1&$i $1&$<|w1&$ |.
3. The new configuration is (i $0 , i $1).
[U-Move]
1. Player I chooses w$ , $ # [0, 1], and a position i $$ in w$ with i$i $$<|w$ |.
2. Player II responds by choosing a position i $1&$ in w1&$ with i1&$i $1&$<
|w1&$ | such that if i$=i $$ then i1&$=i $1&$ .
3. Player I chooses one of the following two steps.
(a) Player I sets the new configuration to (i $0 , i $1).
(b) Player I chooses a position i"1&$ in w1&$ with i1&$i"1&$<i $1&$ and
Player II responds with i"$ in w$ , i$i"$<i $$ . The new configuration is set to (i"0 , i"1).
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We say Player II has a winning strategy in the k-round game on (v, i) and (w, j)
if he or she can win with initial configuration (i, j) regardless of the moves made
by Player I. We denote this by (v, i)tk (w, j). Otherwise, we say Player I has a
winning strategy.
The intuition behind the game is: In the k-round game Player I is trying to estab-
lish that (v, i) and (w, j) are distinguished by some temporal formula of operator
depth k. If the formula Player I has in mind is, for instance, #=.U, he or she
plays the U-move: on the word (v, i) that satisfies # he or she plays a point i $ ahead
such that  is satisfied at i $ and . is satisfied by all the points from i until i $. Player
II does not know the formula # that Player I has in mind, but he or she responds
with a position j $, claiming ‘‘any formulas  of operator depth k&1 satisfied by the
point i $ is satisfied by the point j $, and furthermore the points until j $ satisfy any
(k&1)-depth formula . satisfied by the points until i $.’’ Player I then challenges
one of the two assertions by II. For example, he or she pebbles a point j" where
j j"< j $, asserting: ‘‘You are lying. The point j" does not satisfy ..’’ Player II
then responds to the challenge at j" by choosing a point i" where ii"<i $, assert-
ing that ‘‘any (k&1)-depth formula . not satisfied by j" is not satisfied by i"
either.’’ They then proceed with the (k&1)-round game on (i", j"). Other moves
have a similar but simpler intuition.
The key fact about the game is the following.
Theorem 3.1. For all k0,
(v, i)tk (w, j) if and only if (v, i)#k (w, j) .
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. For k=0, the proof is immediate.
Suppose true for k, we will prove the theorem for k+1.
(O) Suppose (v, i)tk+1 (w, j), and let . be an operator depth k+1 formula. We
would like to show that (v, i)<. iff (w, j)<.. We may assume that the outermost
connective in . is a temporal operator, for if (v, i) and (w, j) agree on all such
operator depth k+1 formulas then they also agree on their Boolean combinations.
There are several cases to consider, based on which temporal operator is the
outermost in .. We will focus on the most interesting case, namely when the
U-operator is outermost. The other cases are similar but easier.
Let .=U#. Without loss of generality, suppose (v, i)<., for if both do not
satisfy . then they agree on . and we are done. Let Player I choose the U-move,
and let him or her pick a witness point i $i on v for . such that # holds at i $ and
 holds at all i" where ii"<i $. Player II responds according to its winning
strategy with a j $ on w.
Now in the case when Player I chooses to set the configuration to (i $, j $), then
we know by II’s winning strategy that (v, i $)tk (w, j $). Thus by the inductive
hypothesis (v, i $)#k (w, j $), and hence (w, j $)<#. On the other hand, when Player
I chooses any j", by II’s winning strategy, II can choose an i" such that
(v, i")tk (w, j"). Thus, again by the induction hypothesis (w, j")<. Hence
(w, j)<U#.
(o) Suppose (v, i)t% k+1 (w, j). We will find a formula  of depth k+1 on which
the two structures disagree. There are again several cases based on which move
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Player I plays first. We again focus on the most interesting case when Player I plays
the U-move.
Suppose Player I’s first move in his or her winning strategy is the U-move.
Suppose, w.l.o.g., Player I chooses i $i in v. Consider the formula
=(.i 6 .i+1 6 } } } 6 .i $&1) U .i $ ,
where .l is the conjunction of all operator depth k formulas that hold true at (v, l ).
(As is the usual convention, when i=i $ the left-hand side of the U-operator reduces
to false.) The formula  can itself be expressed as an operator depth k+1 formula
because there are, up to equivalence, only a bounded number of operator depth k
formulas (this can be proved easily by induction).
We claim that  holds on (v, i) but not on (w, j). That  holds on (v, i) is
immediate from its definition. But  does not hold on (w, j), for otherwise II would
have a winning strategy in reply to I’s play at i $ as follows. There would be a
point j $ at which (1) .i $ holds and (2) for all points j" with j j"< j $,
.i 6 .i+1 6 } } } 6 .i $&1 holds. In reply to Player I playing i $, II would play j $.
Then if Player I according to his or her winning strategy plays the endpoint i $, the
point j $ satisfies .i $ , and thus satisfies all operator depth k properties that the point
i $ does, and we are done because by the inductive hypothesis we have contradicted
the fact that this is a winning strategy for Player I. Otherwise, if Player I plays a
point j" according to his strategy, then since j" satisfies .i 6 .i+1 6 } } } 6 .i $&1 ,
it must satisfy some .i" . Thus, II plays the point i", and by definition j" satisfies
all operator depth k properties of i". Thus, again by the inductive hypothesis, this
contradicts the fact that this is a winning strategy for Player I. K
Corollary 3.2. Given a property K, if for any pair v # K and w  K, Player I
has a winning strategy in the k-round LTL EF game on (v, 0) and (w, 0), then there
is a depth k temporal formula .K that defines the property K.
Proof. For v # K and w  K Theorem 3.1 yields an operator-depth k formula
v, w that is true on (v, 0) but false on (w, 0). We define .K as follows.
.K= 
v # K

w  K
v, w .
Up to equivalence, there are only finitely many formulas with operator depth k;
thus the disjunction and conjunction in .K are finite, and .K properly defines a
formula. The formula .K defines the property K because each v # K satisfies the
term w  K v, w , but no w  K satisfies any such term. K
Let (v, i)tk, r (w, j) denote the fact that Player II has a winning strategy on (v, i)
and (w, j) in the LTL game with k U-moves and r residual moves, interleaved as
Player I wishes. The following is a straightforward refinement of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.3. For all k, r0,
(v, i)tk, r (w, j) if and only if (v, i)#k, r (w, j) .
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The proof proceeds by simultaneous induction on k and r, mimicking the proof
of Theorem 3.1 except that the two resources are kept track of separately.
Remark 3.4. Analogs of Theorem 3.1, Corollary 3.2, and Theorem 3.3 also hold
for the LTL fragments LTL(h) and LTL(m, h), where in each case the possible
type of move is restricted to only the h-move or to the m- and h-move,
respectively.
We note that it is easy to modify the moves in the game in order to capture
variants of the temporal operators.
4. AN UNTIL HIERARCHY
For k1, let FAIRk define a property of words over the alphabet 7=[a, b, c]
as follows:
FAIRk=[v | there is no substring of v in which a occurs k times but no b’s occur] .
For pedagogical reasons, we will work with the complement of the property
FAIRk , which we call STAIRk . We are going to use these simple properties to
separate the levels of the Until hierarchy. Clearly, FAIRk is definable in a given
level of the Until hierarchy if and only if STAIRk is, because these levels are closed
under complementation.
The main theorem of this subsection is the following.
Theorem 4.1. For each k1, FAIRk+1
(i) is expressible with U-depth k, but
(ii) is not expressible with U-depth k&1 (even with arbitrary depth in the
residual temporal operators).
Proof. Assertion (i) is easy. For k0, STAIRk+1 can be defined by a formula
.k of U-depth k. Let .k=h#k , where #k is defined inductively:
#0= pa and #k=( pa 7 m( pc U#k&1)) . (1)
FAIRk+1 is thus expressed by c.k . The interested reader may note that the defini-
tion of .k contains nestings of operators only on the right-hand side of the
U-operators.
To prove (ii) we define, for each k, r, a pair of words vk, r and wk, r such that
vk, r # STAIRk+1 and wk, r  STAIRk+1 , and we show that Player II has a winning
strategy on (vk, r , 0) and (wk, r , 0) in the EF game with k&1 U-moves and r
residual moves, i.e., (vk, r , 0)tk&1, r (wk, r , 0). Thus, by Theorem 3.3, (vk, r , 0)
#k&1, r (wk, r , 0), and hence STAIRk+1 cannot be defined by any formula with
U-depth k&1 and residual depth r, for any r. Hence, nor can FAIRk+1 .
To simplify the presentation of our proof, we define vk, r and wk, r as |-words
from 7|. The proof can be modified to work over finite strings as well by truncat-
ing the words vk, r and wk, r after a sufficient length and adjusting the winning
strategy below for Player II.
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FIG. 1. ‘‘Staircase’’ word vk, r .
For k1 and r0, let
vk, r=acr+1wk, r ,
wk, r=(acr+1)k (bcr+1(acr+1)k)| .
Figure 1 provides a way to visualize vk, r (and wk, r) as staircases. The proof will
essentially show that Player I can only force Player II to climb the staircase one
step at a time, and he or she must use up one U-move for each step. Assertion (ii)
is now established by Lemma 4.2. K
Lemma 4.2. For k1 and r0,
(vk, r , 0)tk&1, r (wk, r , 0).
Proof. We need some definitions: Given positions x and x$ in, say, vk, r , where
xx$, let vk, r[x, x$] denote the substring of vk, r defined by the positions
x, x+1, ..., x$. For a position x, we let TD(x) denote x’s distance to the top of the
current staircase. More formally, for a position x of, say, vk, r , let e(x) be the
smallest position x where a b occurs. Then TD(x) is the number of occurrences
of a in vk, r[x, e(x)]. For position x in Fig. 1, TD(x)=2. Let PD(x) denote x’s dis-
tance to the end of the current plateau, i.e., to the next (or current) occurrence
of an a or b. Thus, for x in the figure, PD(x)=3, and for any position z where
an a or b occurs, PD(z)=0. We will say that a position x$ is exactly one step
ahead of x if x$=x+r+2 and TD(x$)=TD(x)&1. Note that PD(x)=PD(x$)
for such x and x$. For example, position y in Fig. 1 is exactly one step ahead of
position x.
Observe that the h-move is useless on these pairs of words. Unless Player I
repebbles the initial positions of vk, r (in which case Player II repebbles the initial
position of wk, r), Player II can respond so that the remaining |-words are identical.
Claim 4.3 now establishes a consistent strategy that yields a win for Player II.
Claim 4.3. Player II can play in such a way that after k$(k$k&1) U-moves
and r$ (r$r) residual moves, with current configuration (i, j) on vk, r and wk, r , the
following conditions hold:
1. PD(i)=PD( j).
2. TD(i)=TD( j) or TD(i)=TD( j)+1.
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3. If TD(i)=TD( j)+1 then
(a) TD(i)k&k$ (and thus TD( j)k&k$&1), and
(b) if TD(i)=k&k$ then PD(i)r&r$+1 (and thus also PD( j)
r&r$+1).
Proof. The claim is proved by simultaneous induction on k$ and r$. Assuming
the inductive claim, we extend the strategy it defines for Player II to one more
round, maintaining the claim. For the base case: k$=0, r$=0, all conditions hold
at initial configuration (0, 0).
Inductive step on r$. Assume the claim for (k$, r$&1), we show it for (k$, r$).
As we have argued, we only need to consider m. Here, there is nothing for Player
II to do. We just need to establish that the inductive claim remains true when we
move ahead one position on both structures. We omit the calculation.
Inductive step on k$. Suppose the claim holds for (k$&1, r$); we show it for
(k$, r$). We can assume that prior to the U-move we are at (i, j) and that TD(i)=
TD( j)+1, because otherwise vk, r [i, )=wk, r [ j, ), which w.l.o.g. we assume is
not the case. By the induction hypothesis, before the move TD(i)k&k$+1, and
if TD(i)=k&k$+1 then PD(i)r&r$+1. There are two similar cases based on
which word Player I plays on.
Case I. Player I plays a point i $ ahead on vk, r .
First subcase: i $ is at least one step ahead of i. Player II will now play the
point j $ such that j $& j=i $&i&(r+2). In other words, Player II catches up a step
with Player I. Thus, TD(i $)=TD( j $) and PD(i $)=PD( j $), i. e., vk, r [i $, )=
wk, r [ j $, ). Moreover, the substring wk, r [ j, j $] is now a suffix of vk, r [i, i $],
because we took exactly one less step than Player I. Hence, regardless of what
Player I now chooses on wk, r[ j, j $], Player II can respond with the corresponding
point in the suffix vk, r [i+r+2, i $] so that the two remaining |-words are identi-
cal, and thus we are done.
Second sub-case: i $ is less than one step ahead of i. Player II responds with
a point j $ ahead of j such that j $& j=i $&i. But we have thus moved ahead less
than one step and the same amount on both words. We thus have identical sub-
strings vk, r [i, i $] and wk, r [ j, j $]. Regardless of which point j" in wk, r[ j, j $] Player
I chooses subsequently, Player II chooses the corresponding point i" in vk, r[i, i $],
so that we have TD(i")=TD( j")+1 and TD(i")k&k$. Moreover, if
TD(i")=k&k$, then since we have moved ahead less than one whole step, we
cannot be any further to the right on the plateau; i.e., PD(i")=PD( j")r&r$+1.
Case II. Player I plays a point j $ ahead on wk, r . Clearly, since TD(i)=
TD( j)+1, Player II can catch up a step and respond with the point i $ such that
i $&i=( j $& j)+r+2, and vk, r [i $, )=wk, r [ j $, ). Furthermore, note that
wk, r [ j, j $] is a suffix of vk, r [i, i $]. Thus, by the analysis in the first case, we only
need to consider the case when Player I subsequently plays a point i" # [i, i+r+2].
Otherwise, Player II would respond with the corresponding point j" such that
i $&i"= j $& j", and we would have vk, r[i", )=wk, r [ j", ).
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However, if Player I does play i" # [i, i+r+2], i.e., a point that is at most one
whole step ahead of i, then Player II responds with a point j" that is the same dis-
tance ahead of j, and by the same analysis as in first case again, we are done. K
The lemma follows from the claim. After k$ U-moves, k$k&1, and r$ residual
moves, r$r, by (1) PD(i)=PD( j). If TD(i)=TD( j), then vk[i, )=wk [ j, ),
and we are done. Otherwise, by (2) TD(i)=TD( j)+1. Thus by (3.a), either
TD(i)>k&(k&1)=1, in which case we are reading the same symbol on both
words (an a if PD(i)=PD( j)=0, and a c otherwise), or else TD(i)=1, in which
case by (3.b), PD(i)=PD( j)r&r+1=1, i. e., we are reading a c on both words.
Hence, (v, i)#0 (w, j). K
The standard temporal operators Next (m), Eventually (h), and Until (U) each
have past-time counterparts: Previously (m- ), Eventually in the past (h- ), and Since
(S). Their definitions are obvious modifications of their counterparts. For example,
we define Since as follows: (w, i)<.S if there exists j, 0 ji such that
(w, j)< and (w, i $)<. for all i $ with j<i $i. We define (v, i)#+&k, r (w, j) to
mean that (v, i) and (w, j) agree on all formulas with [U, S]-depth k and residual
depth r (which now includes depth in past operators h- and m- as well). We also
define (v, i)t+&k, r (w, j) to mean that Player II has a winning strategy in the game
with both past and future moves where, moreover, there are a total of k uses of
S- and U-moves, while there are r uses of the other moves. It is not more difficult
to show that Theorem 3.3 also holds when #+&k, r and t+&k, r are substituted for
#k, r and tk, r , respectively. This allows us to extend Theorem 4.1 to include past
operators as well:
Theorem 4.4. For each k1, STAIR2k+1
(i) is expressible with [U, S]-depth k, but
(ii) is not expressible with [U, S]-depth k&1.
To prove (i) it is sufficient to note that staircases of height 2k+1 are expressed
with the [U, S]-depth k formula h($k 7 #k) where
$0=true and $k=m- ( pcS ( pa 7 $k&1))
and #k is as in (1). To prove (ii) we set
ur=(ac2(r+1)) ,
v$k, r=(u2kr bc
2(r+1))k+r u2k+1r b(c
2(r+1)u2kr b)
k+r ,
w$k, r=(u2kr bc
2(r+1))k+r u2kr b(c
2(r+1)u2kr b)
k+r ,
and show just as before:
Lemma 4.5. For k1 and r0,
(v$k, r , 0)t+&k&1, r (w$k, r , 0) .
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For the proof here we need to maintain a more complicated invariant than the
one in Claim 4.3, where rather than being concerned only with the topdistance we
consider the minimum of topdistance and bottomdistance and make sure that, if we
are lagging behind one step on the v$k, r structure, this distance is not below the
current threshold (depending on the round we are on). Moreover, since we have
defined v$k, r and w$k, r as finite words in this case, we cannot ignore h-moves (both
past and future) and need to keep track of our distance to the end of a string and
make sure that it is also not below a certain threshold. This is the reason why the
strings are padded with k+r identical staircases of height k on both sides of the
middle staircase where the discrepancy in height occurs. We omit the details.
Branching Time
In this section we observe that the Until hierarchy proof for LTL, Theorem 4.1,
carries over mutatis mutandis to the branching time logics CTL and CTL*. (Please
see, e.g., Emerson (1990) for background on these branching-time logics.)
Consider the branching property _STAIRk=‘‘there exists a path on which
STAIRk holds.’’ The property _STAIRk is expressible by a CTL formula as follows.
For k0, let \k=Ehk ,2 where k is defined inductively,
0= pa and k=( pa 7 E m E[ pc U k&1]) ; (2)
then \k expresses exactly _STAIRk+1 .
Given a CTL* formula ., define 1(.) to be the LTL formula obtained from .
by eliminating all occurrences of path quantifiers, E and A, in .. We let the
U-depth of a CTL* formula . be defined as the U-depth of 1(.). We have just
demonstrated that _STAIRk+1 is expressible in CTL with U-depth k. It is, however,
not expressible with smaller U-depth, not even in CTL*:
Theorem 4.6. For k0, the property _STAIRk+1 is expressible in CTL with
U-depth k, but is not expressible, even in CTL*, with U-depth k&1.
Proof. Having already established the first claim, we have to show that
_STAIRk+1 is not expressible in CTL* with Until depth k&1. This will follow as
a corollary of our proof for the Until hierarchy in LTL, Theorem 4.1.
Note that we may view any |-word u=vw|, where v and w are finite strings, as
a finite branching structure with just one branch. In other words, given such a word
u=vw|, we may define a corresponding finite Kripke structure K(u) which has an
initial linear chain of states whose labels are given by the word v, followed by a
single ‘‘loop’’ chain whose labels are given by the word w. Let su0 be the initial state
on the linear chain in K(u).
Intuitively, it is clear that path quantifiers are irrelevant on a structure without
branching, and indeed it is easy to establish that for any CTL* formula ., and any
|-word u=vw|:
(K(u), su0)<. iff (u, 0)<1(.). (3)
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2 Note that our notation deviates slightly from Emerson (1990); e.g., we write Eh instead of EF.
Now, consider the |-words vk, r and wk, r from the proof of Theorem 4.1. Both
words are of the form vw|, and hence the finite Kripke structures K(vk, r) and
K(wk, r) are well-defined. It is easy to verify that (K(vk, r), svk, r0 ) # _STAIRk+1 ,
while (K(wk, r), swk, r0 )  _STAIRk+1 . Thus the two pointed Kripke structures dis-
agree on the property _STAIRk+1 .
Now, consider any CTL* formula . with U-depthk&1. We claim that such a
formula cannot distinguish (K(vk, r), svk, r0 ) from (K(wk, r), s
wk, r
0 ) and therefore
cannot define _STAIRk+1 .
Note that since 1(.) has U-depthk&1, it follows from Lemma 4.2 that
(vk, r , 0)<1(.) iff (wk, r , 0)<1(.). But then by (4.3), it follows that
(K(vk, r), svk, r0 )<. iff (K(wk, r), s
wk, r
0 )<.
which establishes our claim. K
5. FIRST-ORDER LOGIC VERSUS LTL
Stockmeyer (1974) proved that any decision procedure for satisfiability of first-
order formulas over words requires nonelementary computational complexity. A
close examination of his proof (using his Lemma 4.26, p. 107) reveals that there are
first-order sentences over words, which use only three variables and which have
quantifier depth k and size O(k), such that the minimum length string satisfying this
sentence has size nonelementary in k.3 A corollary of this is that there is a non-
elementary gap between the succinctness of first-order logic versus that of temporal
logic, because it is known (see, e.g., Sistla and Clarke, (1985)) that every satisfiable
temporal formula must have models that are of size at most exponential in the size
of the formula.
We can use the FAIRk properties and Theorem 4.1 to better understand the
interrelationships between first-order quantifier depth, first-order alternation depth,
temporal logic operator depth, and Until depth:
Proposition 5.1. For every k, there are first-order sentences k , $k , and "k that
define STAIRk and satisfy the following properties.
1. The sentences k use only five variables and are of quantifier depth and size
O(log k).
2. The sentences $k use only three variables and are of quantifier depth
O(log k) and size O(k).
3. The sentences "k are of quantifier alternation depth 2 and size O(k).
(Note that the negations of these sentences define FAIRk and satisfy the same proper-
ties.)
Proof. We define k for k=2d+1 via a formula \d defined by induction. A
straightforward modification works for arbitrary k. The formula \d is a formula in
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3 A function f (k) is nonelementary in k if it grows faster than towerc(k) for any number c0, where,
tower0(k)=k, and, inductively, toweri (k)=2toweri&1(k).
x1 and x2 that means ‘‘positions x1 and x2 have a’s, and there are 2d&1&1
occurrences of a in between them, and no b’s’’. (The idea of the expression is
repeated doubling and renaming of variables.)
2d+1=_x1_x2(x1<x2 7 \d)
\d =_x3(x1<x3<x2 7 \x4 \x5(’  \x1 \x2(+  \d&1)))
’=(x4=x1 7 x5=x3) 6 (x4=x3 7 x5=x2)
+=(x1=x4 7 x2=x5)
\1=Pa(x1) 7 Pa(x2) 7 \x3(x1<x3<x2  Pc(x3))
It is even easier to define the $k ’s, i. e., to show that three variables suffice if we
are only interested in maintaining quantifier depth O(log k) but do not care about
size; we just do not need to rename variables in the above. Defining the "k ’s is also
trivial: we just existentially quantify the k distinct points where a occurs and assert
that for all points between them b does not occur:
"k=_x1 } } } _xk \ 
1i<k
xi<xi+1 7 
1ik
Pa(x i) 7\z(x1<z<xk  cPb(z))). K
Of course, every LTL formula with operator depth k does have an equivalent
first-order expression with quantifier depth O(k), as can readily be seen from the
definition of the LTL operators.
Rabinovich (1996) has pointed out to us that if one is only interested in proving
that the Until hierarchy is strict (without obtaining explicit properties that separate
the levels) there is an alternative proof that (for the future-only hierarchy) achieves
this. His proof uses a number of syntactic case distinctions to show that every
LTL(h, m) formula can be written as a Boolean combination of 72 first-order for-
mulas and that every U-depth k formula can thereby be written in 74k+2 . He then
uses the strictness of the first-order quantifier alternation hierarchy (Thomas 1982)
and the equivalence of first-order and temporal logic (Kamp 1968) to prove the
strictness of the future Until hierarchy.
Observe that even though every U-depth k property is expressible in 74k+2 the
FAIRk properties can all be expressed in 72 (see Proposition 5.1.3). Thus, the
necessity of large Until depth does not imply the necessity of large alternation
depth.
6. EFFECTIVE CHARACTERIZATIONS OF FRAGMENTS OF TEMPORAL LOGIC
We now use the EF game of Section 3 to fully characterize the structure of the
automata recognizing properties definable in LTL(h). Our technique is general,
and we demonstrate this by also characterizing the automata recognizing
LTL(m, h)-definable properties, reproving the characterization for LTL(m, h)
first obtained in Cohen et al. (1993), where semigroup-theoretic techniques were
used.
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We want to show that automata with certain structural characteristics recognize
exactly those properties of strings definable in a given logic. To do so, for one direc-
tion we show that for every such automaton and any pair of strings that lead to dis-
tinct states in that automaton, there is a winning strategy for Player I in the game
for the respective logic (where the number of rounds is bounded by a function of
the number of states of the automaton). The fact that the set of strings recognized
by such an automaton is definable in the logic then follows from Corollary 3.2
together with Remark 3.4. Player I will exploit the structural characteristics of the
automaton to win the game. For the other direction, we show that for any
automaton lacking the given structural properties there are, for each k, two strings,
only one of which belongs to the language of the automaton, but on which Player
II has a winning strategy in the k round game.
A deterministic finite automaton A=(7, Q, qI , $, F ) can be viewed as a labeled
digraph in a natural way. We refer to this graph as the transition graph of A and
denote it by GA . We write $* for the extended transition function of A. The closure
graph of A is the labeled digraph whose vertex set is Q and which has an edge from
q to q$ labeled with a nonempty word u if $*(q, u)=q$. This graph is denoted by
HA . (Note that this graph has an infinite edge set. To answer the decidability ques-
tions we are interested in, it will, however, not be necessary to construct this
graph.) The language recognized by A is denoted by L(A).
For a given string u=u0u1 } } } un&1 , its reverse is denoted by u\ and defined as
un&1un&2 } } } u0 . The reverse of a set of strings L is the set [u\ | u # L].
The characterization of LTL(h) is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. For a minimized deterministic finite automaton A, the following
are equivalent:
(A) A recognizes the reverse of a LTL(h)-definable set of strings.
(B) The closure graph HA does not have subgraphs of either of the types (i)
and (ii) displayed in Fig. 2, where a denotes an arbitrary letter, x and y arbitrary non-
empty strings, p and p$ arbitrary states, and q and q$ distinct states.
Note that HA has a subgraph of type (ii) if and only if there exist two edges in
GA that have the same label, sources in the same strongly connected component
(SCC), and distinct targets. Thus checking whether, for a given automaton A, the
(infinite) graph HA has a subgraph of type (ii) can be done effectively, in fact, in
time O( |Q|_|A| ).
Note also that if HA does not have a subgraph of type (i) or (ii), certain other
subgraphs will not occur either:
FIG. 2. Forbidden subgraphs for LTL(h).
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FIGURE 3
Lemma 6.2. If A is an automaton such that HA does not have subgraphs of type
(i) or (ii), then HA does not have subgraphs of the types (iii) and (iv) displayed in
Fig. 3, where q and q$ again denote distinct states.
Proof. Suppose HA has no subgraph of type (i) or (ii) but a subgraph of type
(iii). Fix such a subgraph and let q and q$ denote the respective states in HA . Since
A is complete, there exists a transition starting from q and labeled with a. Since HA
does not have a subgraph of type (i), this transition leads to q, i.e., it is a self loop.
For the same reason, there is a self loop labeled with a around q$. We have a situa-
tion as in (ii), with the roles of the transitions from p to q and from p$ to q$ in (ii)
being played by the self loops around q and q$, respectivelya contradiction.
The argument is similar for (iv). K
The characterization of LTL(m, h) is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3 (Cohen et al., 1993). For a minimized deterministic finite automaton
A, the following are equivalent:
(A) A recognizes the reverse of a LTL(m, h)-definable set of finite strings.
(B) The closure graph HA does not have a subgraph of type (v) displayed in
Fig. 4, where x, y, and z denote arbitrary nonempty strings and p and q distinct states.
The proofs of Theorems 6.1 and 6.3 are given below.
As was observed already by Cohen et al., it can be effectively determined whether
HA has a subgraph of type (v): Consider the labeled digraph G$ whose vertex set
is Q_Q and which has an edge labeled a from ( p, q) to ( p$, q$) if $( p, a)= p$ and
$(q, a)=q$. The graph HA has a subgraph of type (v) if and only if there are dis-
tinct states p and q belonging to the same SCC of GA and such that ( p, q) is part
of a cycle in G$. This can be checked in time O(( |Q|_|A| )2).
Corollary 6.4. For LTL formulas over strings, there is an algorithm that given
a LTL formula outputs
FIG. 4. Forbidden subgraphs for LTL(m, h).
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1. an equivalent LTL(h) formula if there is one and ‘‘no’’ otherwise, and
2. an equivalent LTL(m, h) formula if there is one and ‘‘no’’ otherwise (Cohen
et al., 1993).
Proof. To decide whether a given LTL formula . is equivalent to a LTL(h) or
LTL(m, h) formula, we proceed as follows: first, we construct an automaton A
that accepts the strings satisfying . (see, e.g., Vardi and Wolper (1986)); second, we
reverse the transitions in A and exchange initial and final states to obtain a non-
deterministic automaton B recognizing the reverse of L(A); third, we apply a sub-
set construction and a minimization procedure to B to get a minimized deter-
ministic finite automaton C recognizing the reverse of the set of strings defined by
.; finally, we check whether HC has a subgraph of type (i) or (ii), or (iii), respec-
tively.
To see that an appropriate LTL(h) or LTL(m, h) formula can be computed,
note that all LTL(h) and LTL(m, h) formulas can be enumerated effectively and
that the equivalence of LTL formulas is decidable (see, e.g., Sistla and Clarke
(1985)). A trivial algorithm for constructing an equivalent formula is thus given by
the following rules: on input a LTL formula ., first check whether . is equivalent
to a LTL(h) (respectively, LTL(m, h)) formula. If this is not the case, answer
‘‘no’’. Else enumerate all LTL(h) (respectively LTL(m, h)) formulas and for each
such formula  check whether . and  are equivalent and if this is so, output . K
Theorem 6.1 can alternatively be viewed as a theorem about LTL(h)-formula
equivalence (game equivalence). Let k be a fixed natural number. Let u#hk v mean
that u and v satisfy the same LTL(h)-formulas of operator depth at most k.
The relation #hk is an equivalence relation and is in fact a left congruence: if
u#hk v then wu#
h
k wv, for every word w. We can thus define a labeled digraph G
h
k
whose vertices are the equivalence classes of #hk and which has, for every node
u#hk and every letter a, an edge labeled a from u#
h
k to (au)#
h
k . Theorem 6.1
can now be viewed as saying that Ghk has no subgraphs of type (i) or (ii) and that
every graph without subgraphs of type (i) or (ii) is a homomorphic image of Ghk ,
for some k. An analog statement based on Theorem 6.1 holds for LTL(m, h).
Before we get to the details of the proofs of Theorems 6.1 and 6.3, we explain the
general strategy. In order to show the (more difficult) implications (B) O (A) in
Theorems 6.1 and 6.3, assume A=(Q, qI , $, F ) is a finite automaton that
recognizes the reverse of a property L we are interested in and u and v are such that
$*(qI , u\){$*(qI , v\). We want to show that Player I has a winning strategy in the
respective game (either the LTL(h) or LTL(m, h) game) on u and v, where
the number of rounds in the game depends only on the size of A. Player I looks
at the runs of A on u\ and v\, which we will think of as paths through GA , say
pm w
em pm&1 } } } p1 w
e1 p0 is the run of A on u\ and qn w
fn qn&1 } } } q1 w
f1 q0 is
the run of A on v\.
We say that a pair (e, f ) of edges is separating if their target states are distinct
and their labels are the same. Similarly, a configuration (i, j) of the game on u and
v is called separating if (ei , fj) is separating. We will define a partial order relation
o (more precisely: one for the proof of Theorem 6.1 and another one for the proof
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of Theorem 6.3) on all separating pairs and show that Player I has a strategy
satisfying:
(*) If (i, j) is a separating configuration and (i $, j $) is a configuration
reachable from (i, j) in a round in which Player I plays according to his or her
strategy, then (i $, j $) is separating and (ei , f j)o (ei $ , fj $).
This ensures that Player I wins the game in at most as many rounds as the
number of edges in GA squared. More precisely, Player I wins the game in at most
as many rounds as the length of a longest chain with respect to o .
In order to prove the other (simpler) implications (A) O (B) we will show that
given a minimized automaton that does not have the specified structural charac-
teristics and an arbitrary number k, there exist two words uk and vk such that
uk # L and vk  L, but Player II wins the k-round game of the respective game on
uk and vk .
We need some graph-theoretic notation and terminology. The source state, target
state, and label of an edge e are denoted by _e, {e, and *e. We write s ^+ t if state
t is reachable from state s, and s V^ t if s ^+ t or s=t. Similarly, we write e ^+ f if
{e V^ _f, and e V^ f if e ^+ f or e= f. We write prq if p V^ q and q V^ p, i.e., if p and
q belong to the same SCC.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. (A) O (B). Write L for the reverse of L(A), the
property we are interested in.
Assume first that HA has a subgraph of type (i). Since A is minimized, there
exists a string w1 with $*(q0 , w1)= p and a string w2 such that either
v $*(q, w2) # F and $*(q$, w2)  F, or
v $*(q, w2)  F and $*(q$, w2) # F.
We choose (independent of k) uk=(w1aw2)\ and vk=(w1aaw2)\. Obviously, uk # L
and vk  L, or uk  L and vk # L. We claim that Player II wins the k-round game
with h-moves only on uk and vk . For this, we prove that Player II can play in such
a way that after k$k rounds played the remaining strings u and v are either identi-
cal or there exists w such that u=waw\1 and v=waaw
\
1 (which proves the claim).
The claim is obviously true at the beginning of the game, i.e., when k$=0. There
is nothing to show when u and v are identical. So, for the rest, suppose after k$<k
rounds played the remaining strings u and v are of the form u=waw\1 and
v=waaw\1 . We distinguish several cases based on what Player I does in the next
round. If Player I plays a point i in the common prefix w of u and v, Player II will
respond by simply playing the same point in the other string. Similarly, if Player
I plays a point in the common suffix w\1 of u and v, Player II responds by playing
the corresponding point in the other string. If Player I plays point |w| on u, Player
II will respond by playing |w|+1 on v, and if Player I plays point |w| or |w|+1
on v, Player II will respond by playing point |w| on u. This strategy clearly works.
Assume now that HA has a subgraph of type (ii). We can find w1 and w2 as
above, and we choose uk=(w1(xy)k aw2)\ and vk=(w1(xy)k xaw2)\ (now depend-
ing on k). Again, it is obvious that uk # L and vk  L or uk  L and vk # L. We claim
that Player II wins the k-round game with h-moves only on uk and vk . To prove
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that, we show that Player II can play in such a way that after k$k rounds played
the remaining strings u and v are identical or satisfy one of the following conditions:
(a) there exists a string w such that u=w(w1(xy)k)\ and v=w(w1(xy)k x)\,
or
(b) there exists a number k" and a suffix w of ( yx)\ such that k"k$ and
u=w(w1(xy)k&k")\ and v=w(w1(xy) (k&k")+1)\.
As above the only interesting case is when k$<k and the remaining strings u and
v are not identical.
First, suppose u and v satisfy (a). If Player I plays a point in the common prefix
w, Player II will respond by playing the corresponding point in the other word, and
the remaining strings will again satisfy (a). If Player I plays any point |w| in u,
Player II can respond in such a way that the remaining strings are identical. Also,
if Player I plays a point |w|+|x| in v, Player II can respond in such a way that
the remaining strings are identical. The case which is left is where Player I plays a
point i in u with |w|i<|w|+|x|. In this case, Player II will respond by playing
the point |w|+ | y|+|x|, resulting in remaining strings as described in (b).
Second, suppose u and v satisfy (b). Only if Player I plays a point <|xy| on v,
there is no obvious way for Player II to respond in such a way that the remaining
strings are identical. But in this case, Player II simply responds by playing the same
point on u, resulting in two remaining strings as in (b) with k$&1 instead of k$ and
k"&1 instead of k".
(B) O (A). The partial order we use here, denoted o 1 , is defined as follows.
We set (e, f )o1 (e$, f $) if
v e$ V^ e, f $ V^ f, and
v {er3 {e$, _er3 _e$, {fr3 {f $, or _fr3 _f $.
Obviously, o1 is a partial order.
To complete the proof, we only have to find a strategy for Player I such that (*)
holds (with o1 instead of o ).
Assume (i, j) is an arbitrary separating configuration. Let si be minimal such
that there exists a t$ j with ps rqt$ . Symmetrically, let t j be minimal such that
there exists an s$i with qt rps$ . Obviously, ps rqt . If we had both si+1 and
t j+1, we would have a situation exactly as depicted in one of (ii), (iii), or (iv).
(View ei and fj as the edges labeled with a.) So i+1<s or j+1<t. If i+1<s,
Player I plays position s&1; if i+1s, Player I plays position t&1. In either case,
(*) is satisfied. K
Proof of Theorem 6.3. (A) O (B). Assume HA has a subgraph of type (v).
Since A is minimized, there exists a string w1 with $*(q0 , w1)= p and a string w2
such that either
v $*( p, w2) # F and $*(q, w2)  F, or
v $*( p, w2)  F and $*(q, w2) # F.
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We choose uk and vk as follows:
uk=w1(zkxzky)k zkw\2 ,
vk =w1(zkxzky)k zkxzkw\2 .
The claim is that Player II can play on uk and vk in such a way that after k$k
rounds played, with configuration (i, j) reached, one of the following conditions
holds:
(a) i= j<|w2 |+k$ |z|, or
(b) i, j|w2 | and |uk |&i=|vk |& j&|x|& | y|&2 |z||w1 |+(k&k$)( |x|+
| y|+2|z| ), or
(c) |uk |&i=|vk |& j|w1 |+k( |x|+| y|+2 |z| )+|z|; i.e., the remaining strings
are identical.
There is nothing to show if (c) holds. Before the game starts, i.e., when k$=0,
(a) holds. As long as Player I does not choose an h-move to a position |w2 | ,
(a) can obviously be maintained. If (a) or (b) holds and Player I chooses an
h-move to a position |w2 | in uk , Player II can respond by playing in such a way
that the remaining strings are identical, i.e., such that (c) holds. Player II can do
so as well, if (a) holds and Player I moves to a position |w2 |+ |x|+k |z| in vk ,
or if (b) holds and Player I moves at least |x|+ | y|+k |z| positions ahead on vk .
The remaining case is when (b) holds and Player I moves less than |x|+ | y|+k |z|
positions ahead on vk . In this case, Player II will simply move the same number of
positions ahead on uk , maintaining (b). (Observe that this also captures the case
where Player I chooses a next move.)
(B) O (A). The partial order we use here, denoted o2 , is defined as the tran-
sitive closure of o1 _  where o1 is the partial order relation from the previous
proof and  is defined by (e, f )  (e$, f $) if
v *e$=*f $, _e={e$ and _f ={f $, and
v there exist p # [_e, {e] and q # [_f, {f ] such that prq.
The transitive closure of o1 _  is in fact a partial order: if o2 had a cycle, there
would be a sequence (e1, f 1)  } } }  (el, f l)  (e1, f 1), which would imply a
situation as depicted in (v), with p={e1, q={f 1, and z=*el*el&1 } } } *e1.
In order to establish (*) assume that (i, j) is a separating configuration, and let
s and t be defined as in the proof of Theorem 6.1. If i+1<s or j+1<t, Player I
makes an h-move just as in the case for LTL(h). If si+1 and t j+1, Player I
makes a m-move. This is possible as we would otherwise have pi+1=qI=qj+1 
a contradiction to that A is deterministic. By definition of o 2 , it is clear that (*)
is satisfied in both cases. K
It is easy to see that 2 |Q| and |Q|2 are upper bounds for chains with respect to
o1 and o2 . We therefore have:
Corollary 6.5. Let A be a deterministic automaton with k states and L the
reverse of L(A).
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1. If HA does not have subgraphs of type (i) and (ii), then L is definable by a
LTL(h) formula of operator depth at most 2k.
2. If HA does not have subgraphs of type (v), then L is definable by a
LTL(m, h) formula of operator depth at most k2.
We can use Corollary 6.5 to determine an explicit bound on the running time of
the algorithm sketched in the proof of Corollary 6.4, and the winning strategies
constructed in the proofs of Theorems 6.1 and 6.3 can be used to improve the
efficiency of the algorithm itself.
7. CONCLUSION
We have defined an EF game for temporal logic, and we have used it to prove
a strict hierarchy theorem for the Until depth of temporal properties, independent
of the depth in other temporal operators. We have seen that an EF game designed
explicitly for temporal logic permits much simpler and much finer analysis of
expressibility in the logic than does the common practice of translating from tem-
poral to first-order formulas and using results about first-order expressibility.
We have used the EF games in a new way on finite automata to show
decidability of expressibility in fragments of temporal logic. Recently, The rien and
Wilke (1996) have extended these results to show that the minimal Until depth
required for expressing a given temporal property on strings or |-words is
decidable. Their proof for strings uses sophisticated semigroup-theoretic techniques,
while the extension to |-words makes crucial use of our EF game for LTL.
An interesting question is whether the techniques of Section 6 can be used to
provide an alternative proof, without using semigroups, that counter-free automata
accept LTL definable languages (Schu tzenberger 1965, McNaughton and Papert
1971, Kamp 1968). We would also like to know whether the technique for finite
automata developed in Section 6 can be adapted to work for |-automata.
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